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1. The Traditional Free Will Problem
	According to the traditional free will debate, research in psychology is irrelevant to the question of whether we have free will, or in any case, less relevant than research in physics about whether the universe is deterministic or not.  This is a mistake.  In this article I will briefly diagnose this mistake and then suggest avenues for correcting it by discussing four ways that psychological research is highly relevant to philosophical debates about free will.  
	First, psychological research can help us systematize ordinary beliefs and intuitions about freedom, responsibility, intentional action, morality, and other concepts that bear on philosophical debates about free will.  Since debates about free will and responsibility often make references to what we ordinarily think or say about these issues, it would be helpful to empirically examine whether these references are accurate.  Second, to the extent that ordinary intuitions about free will conflict, research may uncover the psychological mechanisms that underlie these conflicts—and that perhaps drive the philosophical debates as well.  Third, psychological research can study how changing people’s beliefs about free will and responsibility may alter their behavior—for instance, how suppressing the ordinary belief that we have free will might lead to less responsible behavior or different legal practices.  Fourth and most significant, psychological research about human agency and action presents potential threats to our free will (or to the degree to which we possess free will), threats that are distinct from—and more salient than—the potential threat suggested by determinism.  I will concentrate here on psychological research that poses challenges to our ability to act on our consciously considered reasons.
	The traditional free will debate centers on the “compatibility question”: whether or not free will is compatible with determinism, which is the thesis that a description of the state of the universe at one time, conjoined with the laws of nature, entails a description of the state of the universe at any other time.  The primary axis of the debate divides philosophers according to their answer to the compatibility question:  incompatibilists argue that determinism precludes free will, because it purportedly entails that we cannot do otherwise; while compatibilists argue that free will is possible even if determinism were true, because determinism does not preclude the requisite ability to do otherwise or because the ability to do otherwise is not required for free will.  Incompatibilists have then traditionally divided into libertarians who believe we have free will (so determinism is false) and hard determinists who believe determinism is true so we do not have free will.​[1]​  This way of posing the question is well-suited to philosophical (conceptual) analysis, conspicuously distanced from messy empirical data—except to the extent that the truth of determinism is an empirical question, in which case, for some incompatibilists, whether we have free will would depend on an empirical question that could be answered by a team of physicists, presumably while entirely ignoring human beings.​[2]​
	Though this debate can be brought down to earth, as I will explain, notice that, as posed, it is quite abstract and general (it’s supposed to be a metaphysical question, after all).  Incompatibilists argue that, necessarily, if determinism holds in a universe (or the relevant part), no being has free will.  Humans can be ignored since the question is whether determinism would preclude any creature—angels, immaterial souls, animals, aliens, and unimagined beings—from having free will.  In practice, the discussion usually focuses on humans, but our specific cognitive and volitional capacities are often ignored.  Meanwhile, a common compatibilist tactic is to describe an ideal agent (e.g., fully rational and self-controlled) and suggest that such an agent has capacities that are both compatible with determinism and sufficient to secure free will.  But the question of whether actual human agents have such capacities—or the degree to which they have them—becomes lost in the more abstract debate.
	In addition to being abstract, the debate is often presented as being entirely conclusive: either free will exists or it doesn’t (of course, posing the debate in these terms has had the effect of making it entirely inconclusive, leading to what John Fischer (1994) aptly labels a “dialectical stalemate”).  If incompatibilism is true and determinism holds, no agent has any free will.  Some libertarians suggest that the seemingly incontrovertible fact that most of us do have free will shows that determinism is not true.  Meanwhile, the idea behind most compatibilist approaches seems to be that by establishing the compatibility of free will and determinism we thereby establish that we normally have free will.  This, of course, does not follow since the compatibility question is abstract and concerns what is compossible with what, so answering that agents could have free will in a deterministic universe says nothing about whether we human beings actually have free will.
	As we’ve seen, there are incompatibilists who believe we have free will and incompatibilists who believe we do not have free will, and then there are compatibilists who believe we have free will.  There is a logical space just waiting to be filled:  compatibilists who worry that we do not have free will.  And it is a logical space to be filled.  Call this position “neurotic compatibilism.”​[3]​  Regardless of whether free will is compatible with determinism, it may be incompatible with lots of other things.  For compatibilists (like me) who think the truth or falsity of universal determinism is irrelevant to whether humans have free will, and who do not worry about what physicists might discover (if anything) about the deterministic (or probabilistic) nature of the causal relations among physical events, the problem of free will does not just fade away.  Rather, it shifts to more fertile ground and more salient threats.  
	Some of these challenges still derive from metaphysical issues.  For instance, suppose philosophical arguments convinced us that folk psychological concepts—including those that we employ when we deliberate about what to do and that we think of as representing essential causes of our actions—should be eliminated in light of scientific advances, or that these mental states play no causal role in our actions (e.g., that consciousness is epiphenomenal).  Such eliminativism or epiphenomenalism seems to challenge the existence of free will as we know it, and these threats apply to most compatibilist and libertarian theories alike.  Such challenges from theories in the philosophy of mind are entirely orthogonal to the issue of determinism.  Indeterministic epiphenomenalism or eliminativism is a viable possibility.  Conversely, the reality and causal efficacy of mental states or events would not be ruled out by the truth of determinism alone.  For that matter, deterministic substance dualism is a logical possibility.  
	Other challenges to free will derive from empirical claims about human cognitive capacities.  Of course, such claims only challenge free will to the extent free will is conceptualized in certain ways.  But most theories of free will, whether compatibilist or libertarian, suggest shared necessary conditions that include specific cognitive capacities, such as the ability to consciously consider one’s reasons for action and to control one’s actions in light of these considerations (see 3.1 below).  These capacities to be “reasons responsive” are amenable to empirical investigation—and hence, susceptible to empirical challenges, for instance, from results in social psychology that suggest we often act on situational factors we do not recognize and would not accept as reasons for acting.  As Robert Kane notes, referring to another body of research I will discuss, “If conscious willing is illusory or epiphenomenalism is true, all accounts of free will go down, compatibilist and incompatibilist” (2005).​[4]​
	When considering the cognitive capacities involved in most accounts of free will, the question of whether we have free will looks less “conclusive”, less all-or-nothing, than the traditional debate makes it out to be.  In general, cognitive capacities are possessed and exercised to varying degrees.  Hence, different types of creatures and different individuals may possess more or less free will, and individuals may exercise more or less freedom in particular actions.  Information from psychology and other sciences of the mind may suggest that we have less free will than we typically think we have without establishing that none of us has any free will (as incompatibilists argue determinism would show).  This, I take it, is an advantageous implication.  It accords with our intuition that humans develop greater autonomy and control as they grow up, and it accords with our practices of holding people morally responsible to varying degrees, depending on the degree to which they have matured to possess the relevant cognitive and volitional capacities, as well as the degree to which they are able to exercise those capacities in a particular situation (e.g., we tend to mitigate responsibility when people are under undue cognitive or emotional stress).
	Personally, I find it highly intuitive that we possess and exercise free will to varying degrees and that our moral responsibility should roughly track these degrees of freedom.  I also find it intuitive that free will is not threatened by the “bony” thesis of determinism, but that free will may be threatened by certain “meaty” empirical discoveries about the way our specific cognitive capacities work.  And I’m tempted to add that my intuitions are surely shared by most ordinary people untainted by philosophical theorizing—that my views just are intuitive, commonsensical … obviously true.  But, despite common practice, determining whether a position in a philosophical debate is commonsensical or intuitive should not be determined solely by philosophers consulting their own intuitions.  It should be determined by whether most ordinary people in fact find it intuitive.  This is a question to be answered not from the armchair but by systematic psychological research.  

2. The Folk Psychology of Free Will
	Philosophers often offer as support for their views that they are intuitive.  If they mean that the views are intuitive just to them, then that seems to have little evidential weight and will certainly be unconvincing to philosophers who hold competing views (and intuitions).  If they mean that their view is intuitive to most philosophers, then (a) it is unlikely to be true, at least for some of the crucial intuitions in debates as contentious as the free will debate, and (b) we might wonder why philosophers’ intuitions should have special status, at least for any debate that extends outside the ivory tower to deal with concepts and practices of great practical import to non-philosophers—such as the concept of free will and the practice of attributing moral responsibility.  In fact, however, when a philosopher says that her view is intuitive, she usually implies that it is intuitive to most ordinary people.  And, if she is right, that seems to offer some evidential weight for the view—again, at least in debates that involve ordinary concepts and practices rather than technical concepts, such as supervenience or determinism.  I am not suggesting that whether a philosophical claim is true should be determined by whether most non-philosophers think it is true, nor that conceptual analysis should involve simply the systematization of ordinary conceptual usage.  But at a minimum and other things being equal, an intuitive view should not be discarded for a counterintuitive view without good reason and perhaps without some error theory to explain why people have mistaken intuitions.  The burden of proof rests on the counterintuitive view.​[5]​  

2.1 Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?
	Traditionally, incompatibilists have situated the burden on compatibilists in just this way.  They have suggested that most ordinary people see an obvious conflict between free will and determinism such that compatibilism is counterintuitive.  Robert Kane (following William James and Immanuel Kant) writes:

In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural incompatibilists. They believe there is some kind of conflict between freedom and determinism; and the idea that freedom and responsibility might be compatible with determinism looks to them at first like a ‘quagmire of evasion’ (James) or ‘a wretched subterfuge’ (Kant). Ordinary persons have to be talked out of this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philosophers. (1999: 217)

Similarly, Laura Ekstrom claims that “we come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists” (2002: 310).  And Galen Strawson contends that the incompatibilist conception of free will (though impossible to satisfy) “is just the kind of freedom that most people ordinarily and unreflectively suppose themselves to possess” (1986: 30), adding that it is “in our nature to take determinism to pose a serious problem for our notions of responsibility and freedom” (89).
	I have no doubt these philosophers are reporting not just their own intuitions but also the reactions of some of their students.​[6]​  But students’ reactions depend heavily on the way the issues are presented to them, likely influenced by the theoretical predilections of the teacher (an interesting hypothesis that could be tested empirically).  When I present determinism to mean that there is a sufficient explanation for our choices such that without it our choices would ultimately be random, well, then my students tend to express compatibilist intuitions.  Of course, this is a misleading characterization of determinism (and indeterminism).  But it is similarly misleading to characterize determinism to suggest that our actions and choices are caused by forces that bypass our mental life or make our conscious deliberations, desires, and reasons irrelevant to what we do.  For instance, incompatibilist intuitions are pumped when determinism is presented to mean that our choices are caused entirely by our genes or by our brain states (e.g., “An agent would not be morally responsible at all if he was caused necessarily, predetermined, to try to do what he did, by his brain state”), that the forces of nature coerce us (e.g., “What am I but a helpless product of nature, destined by her to do whatever I do and to become whatever I become?”), or that our conscious deliberations are epiphenomenal (e.g., “our self-monitoring and self-critical capacities, so essential to human nature, might as well dry up and wither; they would no longer have any function”).​[7]​  I suspect that incompatibilist intuitions are pumped in large part by conflating determinism with, for instance, reductive mechanism of a sort that suggests eliminativism or epiphenomenalism about conscious mental states, or with fatalism, or with coercion by the past and laws of nature.
	In any case, these claims about ordinary intuitions—and what pumps them—cannot be settled by philosophers consulting their own intuitions and announcing that most people share them.  Rather, they can and should be empirically tested using methods from psychology.  Indeed, under the general moniker of “experimental philosophy,” several philosophers have done just this, surveying non-philosophers’ judgments using thought experiments designed to elucidate ordinary conceptual usage and intuitions about, for instance, intentional action, epistemology, morality, and free will and moral responsibility.​[8]​  
	To examine laypersons’ intuitions about the relationship between determinism and free will and moral responsibility, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Turner, and I developed various scenarios in which we describe determinism, without conflating it with other issues, and ask people whether agents in such scenarios can be free and responsible.​[9]​  For instance, in one study, we presented participants (college students who had not studied the free will debate) with this scenario:

Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature.  In this universe the same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same outcomes, so that every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen the exact same way.  For instance, in this universe a person named Jill decides to steal a necklace at a particular time, and every time the universe is re-created, Jill decides to steal the necklace at that time.

We then asked participants whether it is accurate to say that Jill stole the necklace of her own free will, and 66% responded that it is.  We also asked whether it would be fair to hold Jill morally responsible (i.e., blame her) for her action, and 77% responded that it would.  We developed two other scenarios that describe determinism in different ways (in one a supercomputer, based on the state of the universe and laws of nature, perfectly predicts the actions of agents before they are born; in the other, identical twins raised by different families either keep or return a wallet with the stipulation that their values and actions are completely caused by their genes and upbringing such that they would perform the other action if they had been raised by the other family), and we varied scenarios to include morally positive, negative, and neutral actions.  Across all of these variations, the results showed a consistent pattern:  between two-thirds and three-quarters of the hundreds of participants we surveyed responded that agents in deterministic scenarios act of their own free will and should be held morally responsible for their actions.​[10]​  
	While these results do not establish that compatibilism is more intuitive to non-philosophers than incompatibilism, they certainly put pressure on the received view that incompatibilism is intuitive and that the burden of proof is on the “counterintuitive” compatibilist position.  My current view is that this data indicate that most people do not see determinism per se as a threat to free will or moral responsibility; rather, they will come to see determinism as a threat to free will only if they are convinced (through argument or rhetoric) that determinism has certain implications:  that we are manipulated or coerced, that we cannot do otherwise in the relevant sense, that our choices are fated, that our conscious deliberations are bypassed, or that we are mechanistic systems.  Indeed, I have conducted experiments that show most people do not take psychological determinism to threaten free will or responsibility but that most people do take a reductive mechanistic description of determinism (in terms of neuro-chemical processes) to be threatening.​[11]​ 
Empirical work tends to be messy, so it is no surprise that other results have complicated this picture.  After we ran our studies, Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe developed studies that suggest people’s intuitions about the compatibility of determinism and responsibility differ significantly depending on whether their “reactive attitudes” (e.g., moral anger or indignation) are stirred up or not.  When people read their description of a fully deterministic universe (A) and a universe in which decisions are not fully determined (B), most responded that our universe is like universe B and also that individuals in universe A could not be held fully morally responsible for their behavior.  But when participants read a description of the two universes and were asked if a man in the deterministic universe A who brutally killed his wife could be “fully morally responsible,” most responded ‘yes.’  As Nichols and Knobe (forthcoming) put it, “most people give the compatibilist response to the concrete case, but the vast majority give the incompatibilist response to the abstract case,” and they suggest that one interpretation of these results is that people have an incompatibilist theory of responsibility that they then apply incorrectly in concrete, emotionally laden cases. 
	Now, I have some criticisms of the experimental design of these studies and whether they show that people have an incompatibilist theory of responsibility, but I do not want to rehearse those here.​[12]​  Rather, I want to discuss an important implication that these studies of folk intuitions have highlighted and that Nichols and Knobe draw from their work.  In addition to allowing us to examine what people’s intuitions are regarding free will and moral responsibility, these studies also allow us to investigate the psychological sources of people’s conflicting intuitions.

2.2 Psychological sources of intuitional conflict
	Regardless of whether the majority of non-philosophers express intuitions consistent with compatibilism or incompatibilism, the studies carried out so far indicate that (a) different people make different judgments about the same scenarios (e.g., our results tended to be split 2-to-1 or 3-to-1); (b) specific minor changes to the scenarios can produce significant differences in the response patterns (a finding consistent with loads of psychological research, e.g., on framing, priming, and order effects); and (c) in some cases, the same individual will respond in ways that suggest he or she has conflicting intuitions about the issues.  That is, there appear to be interesting inter-subject and intra-subject intuitional conflicts about the relationships between free will, moral responsibility, and determinism.​[13]​  Careful psychological investigation, informed by philosophers’ conceptual resources, is needed to elucidate the contours of these conflicts and perhaps uncover the psychological mechanisms driving them.  Such work could have important implications for the philosophical debates; for instance, it may challenge the assumption shared by most philosophers that there are invariant conditions of moral responsibility (see Knobe and Doris, forthcoming), and it could establish in what ways a philosophical theory of freedom and responsibility revises our folk theory and practices and in what ways it preserves them (see Vargas, 2005).
	Suppose, for instance, that Nichols and Knobe’s data are confirmed and extended to demonstrate that people have radically different intuitions about free will and moral responsibility depending on whether they are considering abstract cases vs. concrete cases of individuals doing dastardly deeds (which may also differ from cases of individuals doing benevolent deeds).  We then face an important question:  which intuitions, if any, should we care about in our theorizing, those primed by specific emotionally salient cases or those primed by abstract cases?  When it comes to judgments of moral responsibility, should some emotions be considered biases that distort our judgments or rather crucial components required for making proper judgments?  
	The answer to these questions clearly goes beyond the purely “descriptive project” of empirically exploring the contours of people’s intuitions and concepts.  Rather, it involves the “substantive project” of developing a philosophical theory about which of these intuitions are most likely to be accurate, which of them should be preserved and which discarded or revised as we engage in reflective equilibrium.  I take it that this philosophical project nevertheless depends on the descriptive project, though the crucial question of how it so depends is itself part of the substantive project.  As I’ve suggested, I think ordinary intuitions about certain concepts and practices have prima facie but defeasible evidential value, they can help establish burden of proof, and they can set the guideposts for revisionist projects.  It may also turn out that the evidence gives us reason to diminish the evidential value of intuitions, either the folk’s or philosophers’ or both.  Empirical work has suggested that people’s intuitions, at least in some domains, can be influenced by seemingly irrelevant factors, such as their socio-economic status, cultural background, or even order effects.
	Finally, there is a third project, the “prescriptive project” that involves prescribing what we should do once we develop a philosophical theory.​[14]​  For instance, suppose that we discovered that most people have compatibilist intuitions, but the philosophical community became convinced that incompatibilism is the best theory.  In that case, should we work to change (educate) people’s views?  Or suppose we discovered that most people have a libertarian conception of free will and responsible agency but philosophers become convinced that such a conception is incoherent and hence impossible to satisfy.  Should we then work to explain this to people or should we worry that they “can’t handle the truth” and will be harmed if exposed to this knowledge (as suggested by Smilansky, 2000)?  
	Like the substantive project, the prescriptive project requires both going beyond the descriptive facts while also carefully attending to them.	

2.3 The effects of people’s beliefs about free will
	How people think about free will—notably, whether they think they have it—seems likely to affect how they behave.  But this, of course, is an empirical question ripe for psychological investigation.  As it happens, little research has examined this question, which is not surprising given the difficulties involved in first determining what people believe about free will and then trying to examine differences in behavior based on such differences in beliefs.
	The existing research in experimental philosophy does agree that most people strongly believe that humans have free will and are morally responsible (though, as suggested above, it is not clear how to interpret these beliefs in terms of the philosophical theories).  A few people, however, claim to be hard determinists or skeptics about the existence of free will and “robust responsibility.”  It would be interesting to examine whether these skeptics think, feel, and act differently than “optimists” about free will.  Do skeptics conform to moral norms any more or less, do they forgive others more easily, are they less likely to praise or feel gratitude towards others, are they happier or more depressed, are they less likely to be retributivists about punishment?​[15]​  
	A more informative but more difficult experimental paradigm would involve diminishing people’s generally entrenched beliefs that humans are free and morally responsible and then examining the effects.  Would losing their belief in freedom make people more apt to behave immorally or to feel more hopeless (as Smilansky contends), would it make them less apt to hold others morally responsible, would it diminish their reactive attitudes towards others (e.g., indignation) or towards themselves (e.g., guilt)?​[16]​  
	As I mentioned above, it seems likely that people think of free will and moral responsibility as capacities people possess to varying degrees.  If so, then we could also examine whether different people, or even different cultures, believe people generally have more or less freedom and responsibility and then compare these differences across individuals or cultures to see if it correlates with differences in their beliefs and practices regarding morality, praise, blame, reward, punishment, and various reactive attitudes.
	Such information could help inform a prescriptive project about what to do with any relevant empirical discoveries and philosophical conclusions regarding free will.  Personally, however, I find it highly unlikely that philosophers could convince people they do not have any free will and are not morally responsible at all, even if most people have libertarian views and the physicists informed us that the universe is deterministic.  I think it is much more likely, at least in our culture, that neuroscientists and psychologists might present evidence that convinces people that we have much less free will than we thought, and that this would influence people’s beliefs about how responsible we are. 

3. Psychology’s Potential Threats to Free Will
	Peter Strawson observed that our beliefs about moral responsibility are essentially tied to our reactive attitudes (such as indignation, gratitude, pride, and guilt), and these “are natural … in no way something we choose or could give up” (1962: 24).  That is, he thought that it is a basic part of our psychology to express these attitudes towards ourselves and towards those agents who possess the capacities to regulate their behavior in response to such attitudes.  Our reactive attitudes are sensitive to exempting conditions (e.g., whether creatures have the relevant capacities) and to excusing conditions (e.g., whether particular conditions hinder an agent from exercising those capacities).  But, according to Strawson, these attitudes do not call for ultimate justification and are not sensitive to metaphysical conditions (or arguments) that would suggest universal exemption.  Philosophical arguments and empirical facts may lead us to re-position the boundaries between responsible and non-responsible agents but not to dissolve them entirely.  Peter’s son, Galen Strawson, disagrees, claiming that “the reactive attitudes [themselves] enshrine the incompatibilist intuition” (1986: 88), but I take it that the evidence cited above from experimental philosophy suggests that such incompatibilist intuitions are not so universally held.  
	Peter Strawson’s view helps explain why most people would not give up their belief in free will wholesale (even if some people do have an inchoate libertarian theory).  In practice most people think that what allows us to be morally responsible for our actions in a way that infants and animals are not is that we have certain cognitive capacities that they do not—for instance, capacities to consciously deliberate, to understand our obligations, to make choices on the basis of reasons.  These are the capacities I think people associate with the concept of free will and the practices of moral responsibility.  And it would be almost impossible to convince people that they—and other normal humans—simply do not have these cognitive capacities at all.  However, it may be possible to convince people that we do not possess these capacities to the extent we think we do—that humans have less free will than we tend to think we have.​[17]​  What would actually lead people to believe this?  Scientific evidence that challenges the extent to which we possess and exercise the relevant cognitive capacities.
	After briefly describing these cognitive capacities, I will discuss two types of research that suggest such empirical challenges to free will.  One can be brushed aside; the other is more significant.  

3.1 Free will as conscious, reasons-responsive agency
	You wouldn’t know it by looking at the literature on free will, but in fact philosophers from all of the positions in the traditional debate agree about many conditions required for free will.  Most theories, whether compatibilist or libertarian, agree that free agents must have the cognitive capacities to consciously consider alternatives for action and to make choices based on their reasons for action.  A free agent need not consciously deliberate before every choice, since she may develop general principles for action (or character traits) that lead her to act without consciously reflecting on them at the time.  And a free agent need not always act on her best reasons.  But free will requires the capacity to recognize one’s reasons and govern one’s behavior in light of reflecting on them.
	First consider two compatibilist views.  For Harry Frankfurt an agent with free will has “the capacity for reflective self-evaluation” (1971: 12) and is “prepared to endorse or repudiate the motives from which he acts … to guide his conduct in accordance with what he really cares about” (1993: 114).  Jay Wallace describes similar capacities in terms of “reflective self-control: (1) the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, and (2) the power to control or regulate one’s behavior by the light of such reasons” (1996: 157).  Now consider two libertarian views.  Laura Ekstrom states, “An agent enjoys freedom of action only if the agent’s act results from a preference—that is, a desire formed by a process of critical evaluation with respect to one’s conception of the good” (2000: 108).  And Timothy O’Connor argues that free agents “such as ourselves are conscious, intelligent agents, capable of representing diverse, sophisticated plans of action,” adding that he is “unable to conceive an agent’s [freely] controlling his own activity without any awareness of what is motivating him” (2000: 121, 88).  And finally a skeptic about free will, Richard Double, says free will requires self-knowledge:  the agent “knows the nature of [her] beliefs, desires and other mental states that bring about [her choice]” (1991: 48).  And the list goes on.​[18]​  
	Of course, these philosophers tend to focus on their differences, especially their competing answers to the traditional debate about determinism.  In doing so, they neglect more fundamental potential threats to their shared conditions for free will.  While the accounts of these shared conditions themselves differ in subtle ways, they tend to include (at least) these two components:

(CR) conscious reflection:  agents have free will only if they have the capacity for conscious deliberation and intention-formation and that capacity has some influence on their actions.

(MR) motivation by (potentially) endorsed reasons:  agents’ free will is diminished to the extent their actions are motivated by factors that they are both unaware of and would reject were they to consciously consider them.

Potential threats to our free will, therefore, would include any theory or evidence suggesting that our conscious deliberations do not influence our actions (contra CR) or that we tend to be motivated by unconscious influences we would reject if we knew about them (MR).  (Again, these threats to free will are entirely consistent with determinism and the falsity of determinism.)  So, our free will would be threatened by a theory that says our conscious mental states are causally irrelevant to action (epiphenomenalism).  And our free will would be diminished to the extent that research showed we are ignorant of factors that lead us to act against reasons we accept (in such cases, we tend to rationalize our actions by coming up with post hoc justifications).  Of course, we all act without conscious reflection sometimes, and we are all subject to cases of ignorance and rationalization.  The question is whether these challenges to our free will are more pervasive than we realize?
 

3.2 Is conscious will an illusion?
	Some scientists have suggested that our conscious mental states do not causally influence our actions.  For instance, Benjamin Libet’s well-known experiments demonstrated that voluntary muscle movements (e.g., flexing one’s wrist) are proceeded by a “readiness potential” (RP), a brain wave that occurs about half a second (500ms) before the movement.  But Libet’s subjects reported being aware of the “intention, desire, or urge” to move only about 150 ms before the movement—350 ms after the RP.  Libet concludes that voluntary actions “begin in the brain unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act“ (1999: 51), and he interprets this result to show that our conscious intention to move is not the cause of our movement but, like the movement itself, an effect of earlier (non-conscious) brain activity.​[19]​  That is, the common cause of both our experience of intending to act and our action is a non-conscious neural event.  This model of agency appears to reduce the role of consciousness to observing our decisions rather than making them.  
	Daniel Wegner (2002) extends this model to suggest that conscious will is an illusion.  While we think that our experience of consciously willing our actions is indicative of how our actions are caused, Wegner argues we may be systematically mistaken.  He claims that we believe our conscious experiences cause our actions, but the evidence shows that “the real causes of human action are unconscious” (97).  Our experience of conscious will results from having relevant conscious thoughts (e.g., intentions) just prior to the action, while being unaware of any competing causes of the action.  But Wegner, following Libet, argues that the thoughts are themselves caused by prior (non-conscious) brain activity such that a conscious intention “might just be a loose end—one of those things, like the action, that is caused by prior brain and mental events” (55).​[20]​  The evidence for this model of “apparent mental causation” is based primarily on cases where people lack an experience of consciously willing a bodily movement that they in fact brought about (e.g., automatisms, hypnosis) and cases where people experience some sense of agency for a bodily movement or event they do not in fact cause.  These seemingly exceptional cases Wegner takes to represent the rule:  our conscious intentions never cause our actions.
	There have been numerous responses to both Libet’s and Wegner’s empirical evidence and the implications they draw from it, and I will not rehearse them all here.​[21]​  Rather, I will briefly explain why their evidence should not be interpreted as threatening free will.  Libet and Wegner write as if the conscious control of our actions required for free will is only possible if our being conscious of our proximate intentions causes our actions (where proximate intentions are those that immediately precede the relevant actions).  But this is confused for several reasons.  First of all, the way they treat consciousness itself as a cause suggests they are making a category mistake.  Libet writes, “the almost universal experience that we can act with a free, independent choice provides a kind of prima facie evidence that conscious mental processes can causatively control some brain processes” (1999: 56), and Wegner says Libet’s work shows that “the brain started first, followed by the experience of conscious will, and finally followed by action” (55), as if the experience of will is entirely distinct from the brain.  They suggest that consciousness cannot be causal unless it is distinct from brain processes and yet can control brain processes.  If that were true, then well-known problems with Cartesian interactionism would raise more concerns for mental causation than these empirical results.  But our experiences of voluntary action alone do not tell us that conscious processes are distinct from brain processes (e.g., non-physical states).  Rather, our experiences are “topic-neutral” among competing metaphysical theories; they do not commit us to dualism (nor rule it out), and they are consistent with the theory that consciousness is realized in (or identical to) certain brain states.  So, the question should not turn on whether our conscious mental states (e.g., conscious intentions) are preceded by brain states or whether they supervene on brain states.  Rather, assuming a physicalist picture, the question of whether our experiences are illusory should turn on whether those brain states that realize consciousness play the right sort of causal role in our actions.  
	But don’t Libet’s data and Wegner’s theory show that those brain states that realize consciousness are not causes of our actions?  No.  Libet’s data are entirely consistent with another interpretation (see Mele, 2006):  RPs are the brain states underlying non-conscious urges to flex soon, rather than intentions to flex; RPs can then cause a conscious intention (presumably by causing the relevant underlying brain states), which is experienced a few hundred milliseconds later, though sometimes the urge is “vetoed,” perhaps by a conscious intention not to act on the urge.  This interpretation, if true, allows that conscious proximate intentions to act can still causally influence when and whether the person acts.​[22]​  
	Wegner, for his part, presents no relevant data from the neurosciences (other than Libet’s) to suggest that the brain processes associated with our conscious intentions are causally cut off from those that produce actions.  The exceptional cases from the psychological literature that he cites (voluntary-looking movements without the agent’s experiencing control and some experience of control for events the agent does not cause) show only that the experience of will is not always veridical, not that it is never veridical.  Without the neuro-anatomical data to demonstrate that the relevant brain processes are causally unconnected, the best interpretation for these “illusions of will” is by analogy with visual illusions, which certainly do not show that our visual experiences are systematically mistaken.  Indeed, as with most visual illusions, explanations for illusions of will may be given in terms of a generally reliable system sometimes producing inaccurate output because of some unusual feature of the situation.​[23]​  The fact that we sometimes perform complex behaviors without conscious intentions (e.g., under hypnosis) does not show that on the many occasions we perform complex behaviors with conscious intentions, those intentions are causally irrelevant.  
	Nonetheless, the relevant evidence might come in to show that when we consciously intend an action just before we act, our being conscious (and any underlying brain processes) simply occurs too late (and/or the brain processes occur “in the wrong place”) to causally influence the action.  But even if this turns out to be true, I do not think it would represent a significant threat to free will.  I ask you to consult your own experiences of voluntary action.  If they are like mine, they rarely involve specific conscious intentions to move in particular ways just prior to moving.  Rather, they are preceded by more distal and general intentions to carry out various actions, followed by conscious monitoring of what we’re doing to make sure our actions correspond to these general intentions (or goals).  
For instance, in the Libet experiment, I suspect subjects consciously considered whether to participate in the experiment, and having agreed, they formed a (distal) intention to flex their wrist “spontaneously” during the experiment—that is, they did what they were asked to do, to move without forming a specific intention to move at a particular time.  As such, it would not be surprising if this distal intention causally influenced the spontaneous (unplanned) generation of non-conscious urges to move (RPs).  Even if, contra the interpretation outlined above, the proximate conscious urge to move then occurs too late to affect the action, it would not follow that conscious mental states were epiphenomenal.  Similarly, when I give a lecture, I do not form conscious intentions to say what I am going to say right before saying it.  Rather, well before the lecture, I consciously consider what sorts of things I want to say and then I “let myself go,” though I consciously monitor what I say and may stop to consider how I should proceed, for instance, in response to questions.  
	Indeed, according to the theories of free will I mentioned above (and principle CR), what is essential is not that conscious intentions formed just prior to action influence one’s actions but that conscious deliberations can have a downstream effect on how one acts in the relevant situations.  There is simply no evidence (yet) to show that conscious deliberation and (distal) intention formation have no effects on what we do or that our conscious monitoring of our behavior in light of these deliberations and intentions is not critically involved in how we carry out and adjust our actions. 
	Of course, empirical evidence from neuroscience and psychology could show that even these roles for conscious mental processes are minimal.  Indeed, some research on moral reasoning suggests that it is.  This research suggests that when people make moral judgments, they often act on immediate gut reactions and their conscious deliberations just come up with post hoc rationalizations for these gut reactions.​[24]​  And the social psychology research I will now consider suggests a similar threat to the cognitive capacities I have associated with free will.  However, having canvassed some influential work suggesting that our experience of conscious will is, in general, an illusion, I suggest we can at least put aside that alleged threat to free will.  

3.3 The threat of social psychology​[25]​
	The model of agency I just described suggests a sort of “self-programming”:  we consciously consider what sorts of actions we want to perform in certain situations, what reasons and desires we want to move us, and then we go out into the world aiming to act in accord with these conscious considerations (our “programs” or plans of action), and we consciously monitor ourselves, adjusting our actions when we see them diverge from our plans.​[26]​  We are considered responsible both for the programs we consciously endorse and for our failures to monitor ourselves when we diverge from our programs.  Our actions can be free even though they may not be caused by a proximate conscious intention to perform them, as long as they are influenced by earlier conscious reflection or are at least consistent with reasons we would accept.  But what if our actions conflict with our “self-program” because we are influenced by factors that we are unaware of—and hence cannot consciously monitor—factors that may even conflict with the reasons we have “downloaded” into our programs?  I suggest, alluding back to principle MR, that to the extent that we are influenced by such factors, our free will is compromised. 
	Let me illustrate with a representative example from social psychology.  When Kitty Genovese was raped and stabbed to death in 1964, forty people who heard or saw it happen did nothing to help (not even call the police).  Psychologists began looking for explanations for this apathetic response.  The result was a set of robust findings on the “group effect”:  increasing the number of people around a subject decreases the probability that he or she will help someone in distress.  In one experiment, for instance, when subjects heard a female experimenter take a bad fall, 70% of solitary subjects went to help, but if subjects sat next to an impassive confederate, only 7% intervened.​[27]​  Now, suppose that you and a group of friends do not stop to help a woman who needs help and she turns out to suffer great harm that you likely would have prevented.  And suppose, as the experimental results suggest, that you likely would have helped the woman if you had been alone.​[28]​  The problem is that, if you are like most people, you do not know that group size influences whether you perceive or react to such situations, and as importantly, you do not think it should influence you (when asked about the effect of such factors on their behavior, subjects tend both to deny that they had any effect on them and to deny that they should have any effect on anyone).  
But unless you know about the influence of group size on how you perceive such situations and react to them, it seems you do not have the ability to counteract any influence it has on you (sorry if I just increased your responsibility by telling you about the effect!).  And assuming you, like most people, think your helping behavior should be based on how much help the victim needs and not by how many people are around—or other seemingly irrelevant factors that have been shown to significantly influence people’s behavior, such as ambient noises or smells—then these influences limit your ability to do what you think you should do.  In general, to the extent that our ignorance of the influence of situational factors limits our capacities to act on reasons we accept, it thereby limits the scope of our free will.  And numerous experiments from social psychology suggest that we are ignorant of situational factors that influence our behavior—not just our helping behavior but a wide range of behavior, from consumer choices to voting decisions to judgments about other people.  But it gets worse.
	Many people respond to such studies by saying, “Well, I wouldn’t act that way—I would help a person in dire need no matter how many others were standing around doing nothing (or regardless of whether I was in a hurry, or no matter what noise or smell was in the air, etc.).”  And of course, for some people, such a response is accurate, since in all of these studies a minority of the subjects offer help despite the presence of the relevant experimental factor.  The problem is that there is good reason to doubt the reliability of people’s predictions about (and explanations of) their own behavior, not only because almost everyone says they would do what very few actually do (or that they would not do what most actually do), but also because the factors we tend to think make the difference—notably, character traits—do not appear to make much difference.  
In many of the relevant experiments from social psychology, there is little or no correlation between the character traits (as self-reported or measured in other ways) that subjects think matter and their own or others’ actual behavior.  There is also evidence that a person thought to have certain character traits (say, honesty and generosity) does not thereby behave consistently across situations we think should evoke the relevant behavior—that is, “honest” people may behave honestly only in specific types of situations but not others—and that they are no more or less likely to behave generously than people thought to be dishonest.​[29]​  In general, these social psychologists argue that if we want to understand why an agent does what he does in situation X, we are better off either looking at his past behavior in situations just like X or at the way most people behave in X than we are considering what we take to be the agent’s relevant character traits.
	So, research in social psychology suggests three interrelated conclusions that potentially threaten free will.  First, the way we perceive situations and the decisions we then make are influenced to a significant and surprising extent by situational factors that we do not recognize and over which we have little control—and these factors are often ones we would not want to have such influence on us even if we did know about them.  Second, character traits are not robust or stable across various situations, nor are traditional character traits good predictors of behavior.  This suggests that the traits (or “self programs”) we endorse or aspire to develop tend to be ineffective given the power of certain situational factors.  Finally, because we do not know about the power of situational factors, our explanations of our own and others’ actions are based on mistaken folk theories and inaccurate introspection.  Our capacity to act in accord with our reasons is limited to the extent we do not know why we do what we do.  As Nisbett and Wilson put it:  “It is frightening to believe that one has no more certain knowledge of the workings of one’s own mind than would an outsider with intimate knowledge of one’s history and of the stimuli present at the time the cognitive processes occurred” (1977: 257).  
	So where does this leave us?  If these social psychologists are right, I think it leaves us with significantly less free will than we think we have.  Far fewer of our decisions and actions are driven by—or even consistent with—the reasons and desires we have consciously endorsed or those we would consciously endorse if we considered them.​[30]​  That is, our “program” is susceptible to influences we haven’t downloaded as acceptable and would rather have deleted.  But are these social psychologists right?  That remains, in large part, an open empirical question, and my point here is not to answer that question but to emphasize that its answer has important implications for the free will debate.  
Nonetheless, even though I am a “neurotic compatibilist,” I’ll end this section on a more optimistic note regarding the threat of social psychology.  First of all, we don’t know the extent to which these results from social psychology generalize.  Most of the studies involve complex experimental set-ups designed to “trick” the subjects and none of them asks the subjects to deliberate about what they are doing.  It may be that the results do not apply to many human actions, especially ones about which we have specifically deliberated.  For instance, our conscious deliberations certainly seem to influence what sorts of situations we get ourselves into even if we may then be influenced by situational factors we don’t recognize.  Assuming my deliberations affected whether I chose to become a doctor or a philosopher, then they affected how often I would encounter people in distress.  Even if my being in a hurry or in a good mood affects how I then respond to these situations—and even if I’d rather it didn’t—these effects become less significant in comparison to the influence of the life-changing choices I have carefully considered.  Of course (the pessimist replies), many significant choices are made without prior deliberation and may not accord with what we would choose after conscious consideration.  Unfortunately, there is currently very little psychological work on the nature of deliberation and its effects on action.
Another response to the threat of social psychology is to turn it on its head.  It may be that gaining knowledge about situational influences increases our ability to recognize their influence, or even use them to ensure we act in accord with our considered reasons.  Once I know about group effects, I may be more vigilant about choosing to help in an emergency when I am surrounded by passive bystanders.  Indeed, there is some evidence that informing people about situational effects can dampen their influence.  There is also some evidence that the more we know about a certain domain, the more we are able to act in accord with our considered reasons in that domain.  For instance, in a study on voting behavior, subjects who knew about the issues behaved in accord with the reasons they reported at a significantly higher rate than those who did not know about the issues.  In such cases, it may be that our conscious consideration of the issues “sinks in” so that we act in accord with our reasons even if we don’t think about them at the time of action.  When we act in these cases, we revisit a pattern of reasoning we have already made our own.​[31]​  In general, knowledge of our own psychology has the potential to increase the sort of self-knowledge essential for free and responsible agency.






	I have argued that the traditional free will debate has focused too much on whether free will is compatible with determinism and not enough on whether free will is compatible with specific causal explanations for our actions, including those offered by empirical psychology.  If free will is understood as a set of cognitive and volitional capacities, possessed and exercised to varying degrees, then psychology can inform us about the extent to which humans (as a species and as individuals) possess those capacities and manage to exercise them across various situations.  While recent work on the role of consciousness in action has been misinterpreted to suggest its role is illusory, recent work in social psychology presents a more viable challenge to our free will.  The extent to which we can act on reasons we would accept or can know why we are doing what we do appears to be much less than we presume.  Further work is necessary, of course, and it will need to involve both philosophical analysis and psychological investigation.  Questions regarding the nature of human freedom and responsibility clearly require the conceptual resources of philosophy and the empirical resources of psychology.
	A different kind of empirical research is exploring what people believe about free will and moral responsibility so that we can better understand ordinary intuitions about these issues and explore what drives people’s conflicting intuitions.  We should also study how people’s beliefs about their own and others’ freedom influence their behavior and their attributions of personal responsibility.  This last issue is especially relevant today.  We see more and more information from the sciences of the mind purporting to explain human behavior, and often the popular press portrays this information in a way that suggests our actions are caused by our genes or our brain activity, as if these causal processes simply bypass us.  Novelist Thomas Wolfe puts it like this:  “The conclusion people out beyond the laboratory walls are drawing is: The fix is in! We’re all hardwired! That, and: Don’t blame me! I'm wired wrong!”​[32]​
	Unfortunately, some scientists and science journalists suggest that any scientific explanation of human behavior threatens free will.  They seem to believe that determinism must preclude free will (they don’t recognize the compatibilist option) and, more problematically, they treat scientific explanation of human behavior as equivalent to determinism—and therefore as an obvious threat to free will.​[33]​  Psychological research on human agency does have the potential to explain away the existence of free will, though this will depend not on whether determinism is true but on the extent to which the relevant research suggests we do not have the cognitive capacities required for free and responsible action.  But such research also has the potential to explain the existence of free will rather than explain it away—to explain how conscious deliberation and planning affects our choices, how we are responsive to reasons, and how intentional action works.     
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^1	  Not surprisingly, these traditional divisions have become more complicated.  For instance, there are “free will skeptics” who believe we do not have free will regardless of whether determinism is true or false (e.g., Pereboom, 2000) or who believe free will is impossible (e.g., Strawson, 1986).  Some libertarians are “source incompatibilists” (see McKenna, 2001) who focus on the importance of being the originating source of actions instead of the need to have alternative possibilities.  And there are “semi-compatibilists” who accept that determinism precludes the ability to do otherwise but argue that it does not preclude moral responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998).  Basically, almost every logically possible position has been defended regarding the relationships among free will, the ability to do otherwise, moral responsibility, and determinism (and indeterminism).  
^2	  One might argue that psychologists or neuroscientists could discover whether human behavior is entirely deterministic (e.g., whether, given the relevant neuropsychological laws, for any human behavior, there are sufficient prior causes), but it is unlikely such a discovery would not ultimately rely on what physicists discover about the causal processes at the micro-physical level.  See Kane (1996) for a libertarian view that requires quantum indeterminism within the brain.
^3	  Manuel Vargas came up with this label.  The “neurotic” part is more accurate for my view than “skeptical” since I am unsure about the scope of the threats I discuss below, but “skeptical compatibilism” marks an important category as well.  The “compatibilist” part of the label is technically accurate, but it is misleading since it suggests that philosophers holding this position define themselves in terms of the compatibility question when in fact they want to shift the focus away from that question and towards other potential threats to free will.
^4	  Bernard Berofsky puts it nicely:  “All parties to disputes about freedom and autonomy must agree that a necessary condition of the very possibility of freedom and autonomy is that we act as we do for the reasons we cite…. Both [compatibilist and incompatibilist] ought to be driven by the thought that free and autonomous agents are responsive to reasons in a sense that precludes an account of behavior in terms of neurophysiological processes that displace the one in terms of reasons.” (2005: 82).
^5	  It is unclear what intuitions are, though many philosophers think of them as pretheoretical dispositions to make particular judgments about cases or applications of concepts (see, e.g., Jackson 1998).  Some philosophers think that intuitions should have little to no evidential weight in philosophical arguments.  Others think that the only intuitions that should have evidential weight are those of people who have reflected on and understand the relevant issues (i.e., philosophers).  I find these views problematic, but in any case, experimental philosophy has forced philosophers to be more explicit about what intuitions are and what work the claim “X is intuitive” is supposed to do (see Nadelhoffer and Nahmias forthcoming).
^6	  Derk Pereboom writes, “Beginning students typically recoil at the compatibilist response to the problem of moral responsibility” (2001: xvi), and Timothy O’Connor writes, “Does freedom of choice have this implication [that causal determinism must be false]? It seems so to the typical undergraduate on first encountering the question” (2000: 4).
^7	  Quotations are from, respectively, Richard Swinburne (in Fischer [1994: 6]), Richard Taylor (1963: 36), and Joel Feinberg (in Fischer [1994: 4]).
^8	  For representative work in experimental philosophy regarding intentional action, see Knobe (2006) and Nadelhoffer (2004); on epistemological intuitions, see Nichols, Weinberg, and Stich (2002); on morality, see Doris and Stich (2006) and Greene (2003); and on free will and moral responsibility, see references cited below.  There is psychological literature relevant to many of these topics, especially people’s judgments about moral decisions and moral responsibility; experimental philosophers tend to get their hands dirty where the psychological work does not exist or is not conceptually refined enough. 
^9	  For complete information on the methodology and results of these studies, see Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005).  For further discussion of the philosophical implications of these studies and this methodology, see Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2006).  
^10	  Across these studies, (1) main results were statistically significant (more people offered the compatibilist response than would be predicted by chance alone); (2) questions were counterbalanced with no order effects found; and (3) participants were asked to reason counterfactually on the assumption that the description of the scenario is true (regardless of whether they think it is true of our universe).  Whether they successfully reasoned counterfactually is a significant question.  However, manipulation checks were used to try to ensure that participants understood the deterministic description in the scenario, and those who missed these checks were excluded from analysis.  
^11	  See Nahmias (2006) and Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran (forthcoming).  See also Monteresso, Royzman, and Schwartz (2005) whose results show that people will mitigate judgments of moral responsibility when an agent’s bad actions or character traits are described as a result—whether inevitable or just probable—of physiological factors (e.g., neurochemistry or genes) significantly more than when these actions or traits are described as the result of experiential or psychological factors (e.g., abusive upbringing).
^12	  See Nahmias (2006), and Turner and Nahmias (2006) in response to results reported in Nichols (2004).  Note that all of these experiments described in the text have avoided simply asking people whether they believe free will and determinism are incompatible, primarily because, whereas ‘determinism’ has a technical meaning in the debate, most people seem to think it means ‘the opposite of free will.’  Recently, however, Thomas Nadelhoffer asked participants:  “Do you think that our actions can be free if all of them are entirely determined by our genes, our neuro-physiology, and our upbringing?”  Surprisingly, 42% answered ‘yes’—even though the question also suggests a reductionistic picture of agency.
^13	  Other results suggest intuitional conflicts about people’s intuitions about the ability to do otherwise, their attributions of praise vs. blame, and their judgments about the moral responsibility of strangers vs. friends (see Knobe and Doris, forthcoming).
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